photo credit: PappaJack

Tuesday marked the anniversary of Kosovo’s declaration of independence from Serbia. I meant to write about this sooner – but the day passed off largely without event, with none of the ugly scenes in Belgrade of a year ago.

In the extended entry, I’ll look at the effect of this declaration – both in Kosovo and on the wider international system – as well as the mood on the ground, from a visit I made there a couple of months ago.

(and I will definitely return to my mini-series on the EU in 2009 shortly – I should also have a post on Norway coming up in the next few days)

This post has become quite large so I’ve divided it up into the following sections if you’d prefer to read it that way.

• The International System
  • and Serbia
• Inside Kosovo
  • Division of Kosovo?
  • Mitrovica
  • Civil Society

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

photo credit: Iujaz [Away from Flickr]

The Maldives today became the 55th country to recognise the independence of Kosovo, joining the US, Japan, and 22 of 27 EU member states. Serbia, Russia, China, and (obviously) five other EU states have either refused or so far withheld recognition.

Ian Bancroft thinks that states are going to rescind their recognition of Kosovo following an ICJ judgement, expected within the next 20 months, on the legality of Kosovo’s declaration (and presumably that Kosovo is going to be put back into Serbia?). I think this is unlikely.

Each of the five EU states have concerns about separatism (or irredentism):

• Spain’s various regions include Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia.
• Cyprus, because of the ongoing unresolved problems with the separatist northern part of the island, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. I still don’t get why this wasn’t resolved before Cypriot accession, but that’s a whole different discussion.
• Greece is worried about irredentist movements in its region of Macedonia, from the FYR Macedonia, as well as having historically strong relations with Serbia. Also because of Cyprus.
• Slovakia, because of the large Hungarian minority in the south and east of the country (though there are suggestions this could change in the near future, according to B92). This is an interesting article from the DPA last year which (towards the end) hints at some of the problems Slovakia is worried about.
• Romania, also because of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania

This list may seem like a slightly disjointed point to start a discussion about Kosovo, but it demonstrates that even within now (relatively) stable Europe, there are large concerns about the integrity of borders and fragmentation. Kosovo represents the age-old conflict between the twin concerns of immutability of borders and self-determination, brilliantly enshrined in the Helsinki Accords of 1975.

photo credit: Ereine

The Accords were signed at the height of superpower Détente, as part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a precursor to today’s OSCE. Possibly as part of Kissinger’s policy of “linkage”, signatories recognised the immutability of post-war borders in Europe, a key aim of a paranoid Soviet Union that was craving this legitimacy for itself, and its satellite states in the Eastern bloc. In return for this, they recognised respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and “Equal rights and self-determination of freedoms”. The ten “Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States”, on the face of it fairly uncontroversial, are thus paradoxical (they’re worth a read in full).

As a result, while Serbia and its allies can say that Kosovo’s secession was illegal, Kosovo and its allies can say that it is perfectly legal. Interestingly, Russia siding with Serbia is in a somewhat complicated situation as Gorbachev certainly didn’t authorise the secession of any of the 15 Union Republics of the USSR.

(Incidentally — it’s funny that the Helsinki Accords, signed in, well, Helsinki, Finland, have played such a role, as the former President of Finland, Marti Ahtisaari, wrote the plan on supervised independence on which Kosovo’s declaration was based. They’re busy people, those Finns.)

Nevertheless, unilateral declarations of independence have been traditionally frowned upon by the international community, and certainly the UN which after all is a club of sovereign states. In the break up of the Soviet Union, the international community was adamant until the last minute that it would not accept its break up — and after that became a reality, it would only recognise Union Republics who declared independence. Chechnya is the exception which proves the rule, as it is the only non-Union-level Republic to be recognised (until South Ossetia and Abkhazia – more in a moment), and that was by the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The international community also set a deadline for Yugoslav Republics to declare independence.

Thus, despite the unilateral declarations of independence of the past, Kosovo did set a precedent. There are no other examples that I can think of where a country is recognised amidst such continuing (particularly international) wrangling over its status. That’s not necessarily to say that I think the UDI was the wrong course of action – just that it has set a precedent in the international system. The effect of this can very clearly be seen in October last year: South Ossetia (and even more dubiously, Abkhazia) were finally recognised as independent by Russia after hostilities in August/September 2008. The International Crisis Group also points nervously (2007) towards Nagorno-Karabakh, the breakaway region of Azerbaijan currently occupied by Armenia. The two countries went to war over this territory’s declaration of independence some fifteen years ago, with the loss of 20,000 lives.

I was fortunate enough to speak with Ronald Suny about the effect of Kosovo’s UDI (and subsequent recognition of it) on Nagorno-Karabakh a couple of months ago, just before I went out to Kosovo. He thought that it had had a large effect, as it made the de facto administration in Stepanankert, the capital of the breakaway region, believe that the Kosovan precedent may work in their favour. Last August/September’s conflict between Georgia and Russia probably made that less likely for Nagorno-Karabakh, however, as it suggested Russia would probably step in on the side of Armenia — and also because Turkey and Russia have started making greater overtures to each other, conscious that this conflict could set them at war with one another. That probably needs another post! (Although, this is another reason for diffusing tensions: oil and gas pipelines would be one of the first casualties of any new outbreak in Nagorno-Karabakh.)

Nagorno-Karabakh is a complicated example, but in other situations it’s likely that the recognition of Kosovo’s declaration of independence will have emboldened those similarly seeking recognition.

Serbia

Finally, in considering the effect on the international system, we should not forget Serbia. Last year’s pro-Europe (ish) vote was surprising and unexpected, coming three months after Kosovo’s declaration of independence. However, perhaps this will allow Serbia to finally start closing the door on the nationalism which has led the country into disastrous wars and economic hardship. On the anniversary of independence, Serbia’s President Tadić continued to insist that “Kosovo is not a country”, but the rhetoric has been toned down; in contrast to the amibuous rhetoric of the same time last year, he emphasised that Serbia will defend its “legitimate rights by legal and diplomatic means, not force.”

Shortly before last year’s election, Serbia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), a precursor to EU membership negotiations, and the arrest of Karadzic (and reports of greater effort to find and arrest Mladic) suggest that Serbia is making genuine moves towards European integration. It seems as though the EU’s soft power is finally attracting Serbia.

INSIDE KOSOVO

The mood in Kosovo on the anniversary depends who you ask: even the AP can’t quite make up their mind – it’s either ‘jubilant‘ crowds pouring on to the streets, or a struggling, barely-recognised, crime-ridden territory. I think I’d probably lean much more to the former. Maybe I’m naive and overly optimistic, but the ethnic Albanian Kosovans I met seemed genuinely proud of their accomplishments.

That’s not to say they don’t recognise the massive hill they’ve still got to climb: there are indeed problems with corruption, unemployment’s hovering at above 40% (and with some 70% of Kosovans under 27, that figure’s only going to rise in the short term). Then, along with the frequent electricity shortages which make business very difficult, they have to contend with continuing uncertainty over the northern quarter of their already small territory. In Zvecan, just outside the flashpoint town of Mitrovica, Serbian lawmakers on Tuesday adopted a resolution denouncing Kosovo’s declaration of independence.

Division of Kosovo?

These moves are not really unexpected, but they do emphasise the continuing (and in some ways growing) division of Kosovo. The “Six Point Plan” is controversial in Kosovo, as many see it leading to partition, or at least parallel institutions. EULEX, the European Union law and order mission taking over from the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), is deploying under this plan. This is the reason for the large amount of grafitti around the capital Pristina – “EULEX – Made In Serbia” – and “NO EULEX” being written on red traffic lights. So what does this Six Point Plan actually say?

It’s remarkably difficult to find out. This is the only site I could find which actually lists the points, but it doesn’t seem particularly contentious (except perhaps point C, exclusively UNMIK control in northern Mitrovica with local prosecutors and judges). It turns out the “Six Point Plan” is part of the Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (S/2008/692 via this link) (PDF) on reconfiguring UNMIK, presented in November 2008. The Six Points were drafted in consultation with Belgrade; Kosovo rejected the reconfiguration (its response is in Annex I), arguing that they gave too many concessions to Serbia.

The relevant parts of the six points are (from page 8, my summaries):

A: Policing - more localised policing, particularly in non-ethnic Albanian areas

B: Customs - reinstatement of international customs officers (rather than nothing, as is the case at the moment, or else Kosovan customs officers)

C: Justice - for the first 60 days, the new northern Mitrovice courthouse will be staffed by UNMIK only; after that point, it will be staffed by local judges and prosecutors – potentially creating a parallel system outside the rule of the Kosovo Ministry of Justice, especially as “The mix of local judges and prosecutors appointed during the phases will reflect the communities and territorial jurisdictions that they will serve.”

Essentially, the concern is that northern Kosovo will adopt a parallel judicial system, especially as parts B and C include the words “in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)”. Potentially also controversial is that, under paragraph 50, EULEX will operate in accordance with that same Security Council Resolution.

Mitrovica

I recommend at least the first six pages of this report to anyone with an interest in Kosovo. It’s very good at setting out the current situation there, particularly with reference to the north/south division. We travelled to Mitrovica while in Kosovo, and the tension really is palpable. We walked up to the famous bridge across the River Ibar which both joins and divides the two communities – Albanians in the south, (mostly) Serbs in the north. The UNMIK official just before the bridge told us that we were welcome to cross, but that it was a “ticking time bomb”; the Kosovo Police Service policeman on the bridge told us that we could cross if we wanted and that most likely nothing would happen, but that “as a friend” it wasn’t worth the risk. The north side was daubed in Serb flags and cyrillic script, and policemen on the northern side told us to move on quickly, so we returned (also partly because the FCO avoids against all but essential travel there, so our insurance would have been void). We did see people crossing (few, mind) so it seems that it’s not impossible – but the KPS guy at the south side of the bridge told us that he once drove his police car in there and had it smashed up. The Kosovo Police Service no longer insure their policemen driving in to the north alone.

Civil Society

The UN report highlights another big problem in Kosovo: the lack of well-developed civil society institutions, or just the fact that they’re often ignored. This was a key, repeating theme we saw while we were there. One large civil society institution told us that people had been concentrating so hard and for so long on the question of independence, everything else had been put off until this was resolved. The civil society institutions are developing however – from civil, human, and disabilities rights organisations through to media and environmental protection, NGOs are opening their doors and consolidating their efforts throughout.

Kosovo, then, is a long way off full acceptance into the international community, but it is beginning its journey down this long road. The current remaining issues over the status of northern Kosovo present an obstacle and a potential flashpoint for the future, and the possible reinforcement of parallel institutions by UNMIK is something that needs to be avoided. The creation of a true multi-ethnic state in Kosovo is not pure fantasy; indeed, the UN report notes that “…freedom of movement is not a serious concern of the minority communities, except for the Kosovo Albanian minorities in northern Kosovo.” (para 19, p16)

What is undoubted, however, is that this is a place to watch in the future.